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EU	Agencification	and	the	Rise	of	ESMA:	
Are	its	Governance	Arrangements	Fit	for	Purpose?	
1 Introduction	
	
Agencies	 are	 a	 familiar	 feature	 in	 the	 EU.	 They	 have	 proliferated	 in	 policy	 sectors	 from	
border	 control	 to	medicine	with	 recent	 additions	 including	 an	 enhanced	 European	Border	
and	Coast	Guard	Agency	(‘Frontex’),	and	the	creation	of	a	European	Data	Protection	Board.	
There	 are	 ever	 more	 powerful	 agencies	 emerging,	 whose	 mandate	 can	 extend	 to	 quasi-
regulatory	 and	 direct	 supervisory	 competences.	 Recent	 Commission	 Proposals	 advocate	
further	 expansions	 to	 the	 financial	 European	 Supervisory	 Authorities	 (‘ESAs’)	 mandate;	
bodies	with	 legal	personality	but	 agencies	 in	 all	 but	name.
1
	These	authorities,	 are	a	major	
new	phase	 in	the	European	project,	and	demonstrate	concrete,	 if	 incremental,	steps	being	
taken	towards	centralised	and	single	financial	supervision.
2
		
	
Although	 agencies	 serve	 a	 number	 of	 valuable	 roles	 within	 the	 EU	 framework,	 they	 are	
unelected	 entities.	Moreover,	 the	 ESAs,	 particularly	 the	 European	 Securities	 and	Markets	
Authority	 (‘ESMA’),	 have	 been	 granted	 increasingly	 broad	 powers,	 yet	 their	 governance	
frameworks	 have	 weaknesses,	 and	 may	 not	 be	 fit	 for	 purpose.	 In	 such	 situations,	
justifications	 put	 forward	 for	 their	 competency	 based	 on	 agency	 autonomy	 and	 expertise	
can	risk	being	insufficient	to	guarantee	their	continued	legitimacy.
3
	That	being	so,	effective	
internal	 governance	 arrangements	 and	 robust	 external	 accountability	 mechanisms	 are	
necessary	 to	 ensure	 there	 is	 no	 lacuna.
4
		 This	 generates	 a	 related	 challenge:	 an	 agency’s	
mandate	requires	technical	expertise	and	autonomy	for	 it	 to	be	effective;	but	at	 the	same	
time,	non-majoritarian	agencies	must	have	effective	oversight	mechanisms	to	ensure	 their	
enduring	 legitimacy.
5
	The	 significance	 of	 this	 has	 by	 no	 means	 gone	 unnoticed	 in	 the	
scholarship,	 but	 its	 constitutional	 salience	 becomes	 ever	 more	 pressing	 given	 ESMA’s	
powers,	and	the	likely	future	additions	to	its	remit.
6
		
	
This	paper	examines	ESMA’s	 governance	arrangements,	 and	whether	 these	 can	ensure	 its	
autonomy	 and	 legitimacy;	 however,	 the	 analysis	 is	 salient	 beyond	 the	 financial	 zone.	 The	
process	 of	 reorganisation	 and	 growth	 occurring	 raises	 issues	 that	 may	 influence	
administrative	developments	elsewhere	as	a	model	for	comparison	and	inspiration.
7
	In	this	
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regard,	ESMA	is	especially	ripe	for	analysis	as	 it	 is	proving	to	be	the	most	ambitious	of	the	
ESAs.	Rooting	the	discussion	within	the	EU	agency	scholarship,	and	through	examining	the	
governance	 reforms	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 Proposal,	 the	 paper	 advocates	 refinements	 to	
better	balance	the	competing	supranational	and	national	interests	within	ESMA.	Moreover,	
it	recommends	paring	back	of	the	Commission’s	presence	in	ESMA’s	governance	framework	
to	 avoid	 stifling	 its	 autonomy.	 Further,	 through	 exploring	 the	 EU	 Banking	 Union’s	 Single	
Supervisory	 Mechanism	 (‘SSM’)	 arrangements	 (whilst	 remaining	 mindful	 of	 its	 specific	
drivers),	 it	 speculates	 that	 the	argument	 for	 the	European	Parliament	 (the	 ‘Parliament’)	 to	
have	 greater	 input	 in	 ESMA’s	 accountability	 framework	 grows	 more	 compelling.	 ESMA	 is	
politically	 accountable	 to	 the	 Parliament,	 and	 regular,	 nuanced	 assessments	 of	 ESMA’s	
activities	by	this	directly	elected	institution	could	be	a	valuable	addition	to	the	accountability	
arrangements.	 Although	 the	 Parliament	 may	 not	 be	 a	 perfect	 repository	 of	 democratic	
legitimacy	at	the	European	level,	it	is	engaging	with	new	agencies	and	finding	ways	to	keep	
them	under	the	spotlight.
8
		It	can	be	seen	to	be	evolving	into	the	pivotal	institution	when	it	
comes	to	agency	accountability	and	practices.		
	
This	 paper’s	 structure	 is	 as	 follows:	 section	 2	 examines	 the	 emergence	 and	 rationale	 for	
agencies;	 section	 3	 considers	 agency	 design	 within	 the	 EU’s	 constitutional	 framework.	
Section	 4	 examines	 ESMA,	 with	 particular	 reference	 to	 its	 current	 governance	 structures.	
Section	 5	 considers	 the	 Banking	 Union’s	 SSM.	 Section	 6	 examines	 the	 Commission’s	 ESA	
Proposals.	Section	7	advocates	normative	proposals.	Section	8	concludes.	
2 Agencies	in	EU	Administrative	Law	
	
2.1 Evolution	and	Rationale	
	
Although	agencies	are	a	familiar	phenomenon	in	national	law,	in	the	EU,	policy	matters	were	
traditionally	the	mandate	of	either	the	Member	States,	or	the	EU	institutions.	Despite	this,	
over	 the	 years,	 in	 line	 with	 trends	 observable	 within	 domestic	 regimes,	 matters	 have	
increasingly	 become	 decentralised.	 This	 ‘agencification’	 process	 commenced	 in	 the	 1970s	
and	agencies	have	been	introduced	in	a	wide	range	of	sectors	that	directly	impact	the	lives	
of	 citizens.	Agencies	 are	often	 created	 to	 tackle	distinctive	 issues	 arising	 from	a	particular	
event	 or	 policy	 sector;	 accordingly	 they	 are	 often	 incremental	 developments	 meaning	
caution	should	be	exercised	with	respect	to	generalisations.
9
	At	the	same	time	a	variety	of	
rationales	 are	 articulated	 in	 the	 legal	 and	 political	 science	 literature	 concerning	 for	 their	
emergence	 and	 proliferation,	 which	 help	 provide	 explanatory	 power	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
creation	of	most	EU	agencies	to	date.
10
		
	
The	principal-agent	model	(developed	in	the	US	literature)	involves	the	principal	(a	political	
official)	using	their	authority	to	establish	non-majoritarian	agencies	through	a	public	act	of	
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delegation.	The	principal	then	relies	on	the	agent	to	act	on	the	principal’s	behalf.	Delegation	
is	functional	for	the	principal	as	the	benefits	of	delegation	outweigh	the	costs	of	delegation;	
agents	 can	 (for	 instance)	 help	principals	 overcome	 informational	 asymmetries	 in	 technical	
areas	of	governance;	enhance	the	efficiency	of	the	rule-making	process;	and	help	principals	
avoid	taking	the	blame	for	unpopular	policies.
11
		At	the	same	time,	principals	can	only	realise	
the	 benefits	 of	 delegation	 via	 granting	 discretion	 to	 the	 agent,	 and	 the	 agent	 can	 have	
incentives	 to	 pursue	 its	 own	 interests.	 Accordingly,	 agency	 discretion	will	 be	 restricted	 by	
the	principal	(both	ex	ante	and	ex	post)	to	avoid	the	risk	of	generating	outcomes	that	may	
conflict	with	 those	of	 the	principal.
12
		 This	 principal-agent	model	has	 some	 relevance	with	
respect	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 agencies	 at	 the	 EU	 level.	 In	 particular	 the	 need	 to	 bring	
technical	expertise	to	sectoral	regulation,	plus	pressures	on	Commission	resources	has	led	to	
specific	and	complex	tasks	being	delegated	to	EU	agencies.
13
	At	the	same	time,	the	principal-
agent	rationale	does	not	fully	account	for	the	idiosyncrasies	of	the	EU	model,	not	least	that	
there	 is	 not	 one	 clearly	 articulated	principal	 given	 that	 the	 EU	 institutional	 architecture	 is	
specifically	defined	to	avoid	the	risk	of	concentrations	of	power.
14
		
	
Given	this,	 the	development	of	agencies	 in	EU	 law	can	also	be	understood	as	a	product	of	
political	 compromise	 between	 the	 EU	 institutions	 and	Member	 States.	 Specifically,	 as	 the	
single	market	 project	 expanded,	 the	 Commission	 identified	 a	 need	 and	 an	 opportunity	 to	
expand	the	EU’s	regulatory	capacity	but	also	recognised	that	there	would	be	resistance	from	
the	Member	States	in	the	Council	to	additional	transfers	of	power	to	the	Commission.	Given	
this,	 the	 Commission	 sought	 to	 expand	 the	 EU’s	 regulatory	 capacity	 via	 the	 creation	 of	
specialist	agencies,	which	the	Member	States	supported,	subject	to	controls	being	in	place,	
including	through	agency	control	via	national	appointees.
15
		
	
In	 conjunction	 with	 this,	 agencies	 can	 also	 be	 appealing	 political	 solutions	 to	 crises:	 for	
example,	mad	cow	disease	 lead	 to	 the	creation	of	 the	Food	Safety	Authority;	 the	 financial	
crisis	produced	the	ESAs;	and	the	refugee	crisis	transformed	an	existing	agency	into	Frontex.	
Such	responses	are	connected	to	particular	issues	having	high	political	salience	and	the	need	
for	institutions	to	be	seen	to	be	responding	in	their	aftermath.	It	can	also	be	an	attempt	to	
rationalise	the	policy	area,	and	to	adopt	technical	approaches	to	decision	making.
16
	Finally,	
while	all	such	rationales	help	provide	much	explanatory	power,	 in	practice,	the	decision	to	
create	 new	 agencies,	 especially	 since	 the	 1990s	 reflects	 the	 trends	 within	 administrative	
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policy	and	public	management.	In	this	regard	EU	institutions	were	influenced	by	the	spread	
of	so-called	new	public	management	norms	in	the	Member	States.
17
	
3 Agency	Design:	The	EU	Constitutional	Framework	
	
3.1 Legal	Basis		
	
The	rise	and	proliferation	of	agencies	in	EU	law	is	remarkable,	not	least	because	there	is	no	
explicit	legal	basis	for	their	creation	in	the	Treaties.
18
	This	has	been	the	subject	of	debate	for	
some	time,	and	although	there	were	earlier	attempts	to	include	a	legal	basis	in	the	Treaties,	
this	question	has	still	not	been	tackled	head	on.	Despite	this	the	Lisbon	Treaty	does	formally	
introduce	EU	agencies,	providing	that	the	Court	of	Justice	(‘CJEU’)	can	 judicially	review	the	
legality	of	their	acts,	which	helps	constitutionalise	their	operation	and	decision-making.
19
	In	
terms	 of	 the	 legal	 basis	 used	 in	 practice,	 most	 early	 agencies	 were	 based	 on	 article	 352	
TFEU;	 the	 residual	 basis	 to	 attain	 a	 Treaty	 objective	 where	 no	 other	 provision	 gives	 the	
institutions	 the	 power.	 This	 has	 since	 been	 modified,	 the	 Commission’s	 view	 being	 that	
agencies	are	instruments	of	implementation	of	a	specific	policy.	Accordingly	they	are	based	
on	Treaty	provisions	that	provide	the	specific	legal	basis	for	that	policy	(such	as	with	respect	
to	transport)	and,	more	generally,	the	internal	market	basis.
20
			
	
Nonetheless,	using	the	internal	market	basis,	article	114	TFEU	has	not	been	straightforward.	
The	UK	 unsuccessfully	 challenged	 the	 legality	 of	 establishing	 agencies	 on	 this	 basis	 in	 the	
case	of	the	European	Network	and	Information	Security	Agency.	At	the	same	time,	this	was	
arguably	 less	due	to	fundamental	objections	as	to	 its	creation	and	more	due	to	article	114	
using	the	qualified	majority	voting	(‘QMV’)	procedure,	meaning	the	UK	could	be	outvoted	in	
the	 Council.
21
	More	 recently,	 the	 view	 that	 agencies	 could	 be	 adopted	 on	 the	 internal	
market	 basis	 was	 endorsed	 by	 the	 CJEU	 in	 2014.	 As	 discussed	 further	 below,	 the	 UK	
challenged	ESMA’s	emergency	powers	with	respect	to	short	selling	(the	‘Short	Selling’	ruling)	
on	a	number	of	grounds	including	the	use	of	article	114,	but	the	CJEU	affirmed	that	this	was	
the	correct	basis.
22
	
	
3.2 Delegation	of	Powers:	Meroni		
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In	relation	to	which	powers	can	be	delegated	to	agencies,	the	starting	point	 is	the	seminal	
Meroni	 judgement.
23
	This	 is	 an	 important	 limitation	with	 respect	 to	 agencies	 and	 it	 arose	
from	 a	 challenge	 brought	 against	 the	 High	 Authority	 of	 the	 Coal	 and	 Steel	 Community	
relating	to	a	delegation	of	power	to	a	body	established	by	private	 law.	 In	Meroni	the	CJEU	
stated	that	the	High	Authority	was	entitled	to	delegate	its	powers	to	such	a	body,	subject	to	
restrictions	imposed	by	the	Coal	and	Steel	Community	Treaty.	Such	powers	could	only	relate	
to	clearly	defined	executive	powers,	the	use	of	which,	had	to	be	subject	in	their	entirety,	to	
review	 by	 the	 High	 Authority.
24
		 The	 CJEU	 drew	 its	 famous	 distinction	 between	 clearly	
defined	executive	powers,	the	exercise	of	which	could	be	subject	to	strict	review	in	the	light	
of	 objective	 criteria	 determined	 by	 the	 delegating	 authority,	 and	 discretionary	 powers	
implying	a	wide	measure	of	discretion,	which	may	make	possible	the	execution	of	economic	
policy.
25
		The	former	could	be	delegated	but	the	 latter	could	not.	The	CJEU	concluded	that	
the	delegation	of	powers	implied	a	wide	measure	of	discretion	that	could	not	be	considered	
compatible	 with	 the	 Treaty	 requirements.
26
	Accordingly,	 following	Meroni,	 and	 until	 the	
Short	 Selling	 ruling,	 Meroni	 was	 the	 legal	 limit	 to	 delegation;	 where	 the	 CJEU	 upheld	
delegations	of	power,	this	was	by	reference	to	Meroni	reasoning.
27
	Meroni	also	shaped	the	
Commission’s	approach	to	agencies	and	the	limits	to	delegation.		
	
More	 recently,	 however,	 as	 Craig	 argues,	 political	 imperatives	 led	 to	 institutional	
developments,	 which	 placed	 the	 traditional	 legal	 interpretation	 under	 strain.
28
	The	 most	
notable	 case	 being	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
ESAs:	 ESMA,	 the	 European	 Banking	 Authority	 (‘EBA’),	 and	 the	 European	 Insurance	 and	
Occupational	Pension	Authority	(‘EIOPA’).	The	ESAs	stemmed	from	the	de	Larosière	report;	
this	recognised	that	the	strength	of	EU	regulation	and	supervision	was	found	wanting	during	
the	 crisis	 and	 proposed	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 European	 System	of	 Financial	 Supervision,	
which	 included	 the	ESAs.
29
		 In	 this	 regard,	 the	ESAs	have	been	constituted	as	 independent	
bodies	with	legal	personality,	although	they	have	been	heavily	influenced	by	the	restrictions	
shaping	agency	design.
30
			
	
With	 respect	 to	 ESMA,	 these	 institutional	 transformations	 have	 included	 it	 being	 granted	
quasi-rule	making	powers,	as	well	as	supervisory	competences,	some	of	which	are	a	notable	
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(OUP	2012).	
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change	from	those	conferred	on	earlier	agencies,	and	some	of	which	also	go	beyond	those	
conferred	 on	 the	 other	 ESAs.	 In	 addition	 to	 its	 more	 orthodox	 ‘soft’	 powers	 (including	
information	exchange	between	authorities),	its	mandate	has	extended	to	encompass	direct	
supervisory	 powers	 over	 particular	 market	 participants	 (including	 credit	 rating	 agencies),	
emergency	 direct	 powers	 of	 intervention,	 and	 limited	 enforcement	 powers.
31
	In	 essence,	
ESMA	 heralds	 a	 new	 dawn	 for	 EU	 agencies.	 Its	 powers	 are	 in	 clear	 contrast	 to	 those	
delegated	 to	 traditional	agencies,	whose	 role	was	 largely	 rooted	 in	 the	 implementation	of	
legislation.		
	
Accordingly,	it	is	pertinent	to	reflect	on	ESMA’s	mandate	as	both	a	quasi-rule	maker	and	as	a	
supervisory	 authority,	 and	 how	 this	 connects	 to	 the	 Treaty	 framework	 and	 Meroni,	
particularly	 in	 light	of	the	UK’s	challenges	in	 its	Short	Selling	application.	This	then	sets	the	
scene	 for	 the	 related	questions	 that	 then	arise	with	 respect	 to	ESMA’s	governance	and	 its	
accountability.		
	
3.2.1 ESMA	as	a	Quasi-Rule	Maker	–	Undermining	the	TFEU?		
As	 an	 institutional	 matter,	 although	 the	 political	 institutions	 are	 responsible	 for	 adopting	
‘level	1’	EU	legislation,	ESMA,	and	the	other	ESAs,	have	significant	quasi-rule	making	powers.	
This	is	not	the	only	instance	of	agencies	having	the	ability	to	contribute	to	such	procedures;	
the	 European	 Chemicals	 Agency	 (‘ECA’)	 provides	 recommendations	 to	 the	 Commission	 to	
assist	it	in	taking	decisions	on	the	inclusion	of	substances	subject	to	authorisation	under	the	
relevant	 legislation.
32
	Similarly,	 the	European	Aviation	 Safety	Agency	enjoys	 an	element	of	
quasi-regulatory	autonomy	to	take	individual	decisions	where	these	do	not	entail	significant	
discretionary	powers.
33
		
	
Yet	ESMA	(and	the	other	ESAs)	are	a	step	change	from	this,	however.	In	addition	to	issuing	
soft	 law	measures,	 ESMA	 has	 appreciable	 quasi-rule	making	 powers	 through	which	 it	 can	
directly	 advance	 the	 EU’s	 single	 rulebook.	 ESMA	 can	 prepare	 technical	 standards	 to	 be	
submitted	 to	 the	 Commission	 for	 endorsement	 into	 law.
34
	Depending	 on	 the	 mandate,	
ESMA	 can	 either	 develop	 draft	 regulatory	 technical	 standards,	 or	 implementing	 technical	
standards;	in	both	cases	these	are	not	to	imply	policy	choices,	or	strategic	decisions.
35
	At	the	
same	time,	and	as	discussed	in	section	3.2.2	below,	questions	of	policy	may	often	be	deeply	
enmeshed	in	technical	issues,	begging	the	question	if	it	is	possible	to	separate	them.	
	
																																								 																				
31
	Regulation	(EU)	No	1095/2010	Establishing	ESMA	[2010]	OJ	L331/84,	e.g.	arts	17-19;	arts	21	and	29;	
see	also	e.g.	Regulation	 (EU)	No	513/2011	on	Credit	Rating	Agencies	OJ	 L145/30	 (part	of	a	 suite	of	
regulations,	and	which	transfers	day-to-day	supervisory	responsibilities	to	ESMA).	
32
	ECA,	Recommendation	 for	 the	 Inclusion	 of	 Substances	 to	 REACH	 (February	 2018);	 Edoardo	 Chiti,	
‘European	Agencies'	Rulemaking:	Powers,	Procedures	and	Assessment’	(2013)	19	ELJ	93.	
33
	Regulation	 (EC)	No	216/2008	Establishing	 an	European	Aviation	 Safety	Agency	 [2008]	OJ	 L79,	 art	
17(2)(b);	 Dehousse,	 ‘Delegation	 of	 Powers	 in	 the	 European	Union:	 The	 Need	 for	 a	Multi-Principals	
Model’	(n	10);	Edoardo	Chiti,	‘European	Agencies'	Rulemaking:	Powers,	Procedures	and	Assessment’	
(n	32).	
34
	Regulation	1095/2010,	arts	10-15.	
35
	Ibid	art	10;	art	15.	
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Regulatory	 technical	 standards	 are	 of	 a	 quasi-legal	 nature	 capable	 of	 amending	 or	
supplementing	 non-essential	 elements	 of	 a	 level	 1	 act.	 ESMA’s	 powers	 represent	 a	
delegation	 of	 law-making	 powers	 from	 the	 institutions,	 which	 remain	 in	 charge	 of	
overseeing	its	exercise.	The	Commission	may	reject	the	draft	standards,	and	they	are	subject	
to	a	veto	by	the	Council	or	Parliament,	but	if	endorsed	they	become	binding	delegated	acts	
under	article	290	TFEU.	ESMA	can	also	adopt	draft	implementing	technical	standards.	These	
connect	to	the	article	291	TFEU	powers	and	procedure,	and	facilitate	binding	implementing	
acts	being	adopted	by	 the	Commission	where	uniform	conditions	 for	 implementing	 legally	
binding	acts	are	needed.
36
	Granted,	the	distinction	between	the	two	types	of	standard	is	by	
no	means	 always	 obvious;	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 ‘the	 existence	 of	 borderline	 cases	 does	 not	
imply	the	absence	of	clear	positive	or	negative	ones’.
37
	
	
As	 an	 institutional	 matter,	 all	 of	 the	 ESAs	 being	 given	 these	 quasi-rule	 making	 powers	 is	
based	 around	 their	 high	 degree	 of	 professional	 expertise,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	
there	 are	 strong	 legal	 and	 political	 assumptions	 that	 such	 rules	 will	 be	 accepted	 by	 the	
Commission.
38
	Yet	 the	 reality	demonstrates	 there	are	 real	 limitations	on	 the	ESAs’	 reach.
39
	
Focusing	 on	 ESMA,	 the	 Commission	 on	 occasion	 rejects	 or	 revises	 the	 proposals	 (which	
sometimes	meets	with	resistance)	but	the	Commission	generally	places	its	own	final	stamp	
on	the	provisions,	reiterating	its	position	as	‘top	dog’	in	this	norm-crafting	process.
40
			
	
Connecting	this	institutional	framework	to	the	Treaty,	the	TFEU	is	enigmatic	on	agencies	in	
relation	 to	 articles	 290	 and	 291,	 and	 this	 formed	 a	 part	 of	 the	UK’s	 challenge	 in	 its	Short	
Selling	application.	Although	the	case	stemmed	from	ESMA’s	direct	powers	of	 intervention	
under	the	Short	Selling	Regulation	(the	‘SSR’)	rather	than	its	quasi-rule	making	capacity,	one	
of	the	UK’s	pleas	suggested	that	the	delegation	of	powers	to	ESMA	empowered	it	to	adopt	
administrative	rules	of	general	application	in	breach	of	articles	290	and	291.
41
		
3.2.1.1 CJEU:	Articles	290	and	291	
	
The	 Advocate	 General	 considered	 that	 articles	 290	 and	 291	 had	 been	 fully	 respected	 but	
took	the	view	that	these	powers	had	been	conferred	directly	by	the	legislature	rather	than	
being	 delegated.	 In	 the	 event	 the	 powers	 had	 been	 delegated,	 however,	 he	 opined	 that	
agencies	could	not	act	directly	under	article	290	(as	this	could	change	the	normative	content	
of	 legislative	 acts),	 but	 that	 agencies	 could	 be	 vested	 with	 article	 291	 implementing	
powers.
42
		
	
																																								 																				
36
	Heikki	Marjosola,	‘Regulating	Financial	Markets	under	Uncertainty:	The	EU	Approach’	(2014)	39	ELR	
338.	
37
	Case	C-270/12	UK	v	Council	and	Parliament	Opinion	of	AG,	ECLI:EU:C:2013:562	at	para	78.	
38
	Paul	Craig,	UK,	EU	and	Global	Administrative	Law:	Foundations	and	Challenges	(n	4)	chapter	4.	
39
	Niamh	Moloney,	‘International	Financial	Governance,	the	EU,	and	Brexit:	The	‘Agencification’	of	EU	
Financial	 Governance	 and	 the	 Implications’	 (2016)	 17	 EBOR	 451;	 Niamh	 Moloney,	 ‘Institutional	
Governance	and	Capital	Markets	Union:	Incrementalism	or	a	"Big	Bang"?’	(2016)	13	ECFR	376.	
40
	ESAs,	Opinion	 on	 the	 Commission’s	 Amendments	 of	 the	 Regulatory	 Technical	 Standards	 on	 Risk	
Mitigation	Techniques	for	OTC	Derivatives	Not	Cleared	by	a	Central	Counterparty	(8	September	2016);	
Commission,	Explanatory	Memorandum	C(2016)	6329	Final	(4	October	2016).		
41
	UK	v	Council	and	Parliament	(n	15)	pleas	in	law	and	main	arguments.		
42
	UK	v	Council	and	Parliament	(n	37)	para	6;	paras	85-86.	
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The	CJEU	dismissed	the	UK’s	plea	although	it	did	not	address	the	conferral	versus	delegation	
issue.	Rather,	it	took	a	pragmatic	stance,	asking	whether	articles	290	and	291	amounted	to	a	
single	framework	under	which	certain	powers	could	be	attributed	solely	to	the	Commission,	
or	 whether	 other	 systems	 may	 be	 contemplated,	 and	 it	 affirmed	 the	 latter.
43
	It	
acknowledged	 that	 the	 Treaties	 did	 not	 contain	 any	 provisions	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 powers	
could	be	delegated	 to	an	agency,	but	 that	 there	were	provisions	 that	presupposed	 such	a	
possibility,	 particularly	 article	 263	 TFEU	 that	 provided	 for	 agencies’	 acts	 to	 be	 subject	 to	
judicial	review.
44
		Moreover	the	CJEU	held	that	ESMA’s	powers	did	not	correspond	to	any	of	
the	 situations	defined	 in	 articles	 290	 and	291,	 but	when	 read	as	 a	 part	 of	 comprehensive	
framework	enabling	national	and	supranational	bodies	to	work	closely	together	with	a	high	
level	of	expertise,	this	could	not	be	regarded	as	undermining	articles	290	and	291.
45
			
	
Consequently,	the	CJEU	read	ESMA’s	powers	not	in	isolation	but	as	part	of	a	series	of	rules	
designed	 to	 ensure	 financial	 stability	 in	 the	 Union.
46
		 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 CJEU’s	 practical	
approach	helped	 to	bridge	 the	awkward	 ‘constitutional	 gap’	 that	had	been	emerging	with	
respect	 to	 EU	 executive	 rulemaking.	 It	 recognised	 a	 constitutional	mandate	 to	 grant	 such	
powers	to	agencies	despite	the	neglect	 in	the	TFEU,	representing	a	further	step	forward	in	
restructuring	EU	executive	law-making	after	the	Lisbon	Treaty.
47
				
	
3.2.1.2 CJEU	and	Romano	
	
Connected	 with	 its	 article	 290	 and	 291	 plea,	 the	 UK	 also	 suggested	 that	 the	 powers	 in	
question	authorised	ESMA	to	adopt	quasi-legislative	measures	of	general	application	having	
the	 force	of	 law,	 contrary	 to	 the	principles	established	by	 the	CJEU	 ruling	 in	Romano.	The	
Advocate	 General	 disagreed,	 taking	 the	 view	 that	 the	 evolution	 of	 EU	 constitutional	 law	
under	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 had	 accommodated	 the	 pivotal	 concerns	 in	Romano,	particularly	
with	respect	to	the	provision	of	effective	judicial	safeguards.
48
			
	
The	 CJEU	 also	 rejected	 the	 plea;	 it	 considered	 that	 ESMA	 did	 adopt	measures	 of	 general	
application	but	that	this	had	been	envisaged	by	the	TFEU	and	was	not	at	odds	with	Romano	
(as	 long	as	 the	Meroni	conditions	were	met).	 In	particular,	 the	TFEU,	articles	263	and	277,	
extended	 the	 CJEU’s	 jurisdiction	 to	 review	 legal	 acts	 adopted	 by	 agencies,	 and	 expressly	
permitted	 Union	 bodies,	 offices	 and	 agencies	 to	 adopt	 acts	 of	 general	 application.
49
	
Accordingly,	the	CJEU’s	flexible	approach,	when	viewed	in	conjunction	with	its	approach	to	
articles	 290	 and	 article	 291	 (as	 well	 as	 with	 respect	 to	Meroni	 discussed	 in	 section	 3.2.2	
below),	created	the	potential	for	a	future	wide	operating	arena	for	EU	agencies.
50
	
																																								 																				
43
	UK	v	Council	and	Parliament	para	78.	
44
	Ibid	paras	79-81.	
45
	Ibid	paras	85-86.	
46
	Ibid	para	85.	
47
	Heikki	Marjosola,	‘Bridging	the	Constitutional	Gap	in	EU	Executive	Rulemaking’	(2015)	10	European	
Constitutional	Law	Review	500;	Ellen	Vos	(n	13)	section	3.2.	
48
	UK	v	Council	and	Parliament	(n	37)	paras	72-74.	
49
	UK	v	Council	and	Parliament	(n	43)	paras	64-66.	
50
	Michelle	 Everson	 and	 Ellen	 Vos,	 European	 Agencies:	 What	 About	 the	 Institutional	 Balance?	
(Maastricht	Faculty	of	Law	Working	Paper	2014/4,	2014);	Niamh	Moloney	(n	6).	
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3.2.2 ESMA’s	Supervisory	Powers	and	Meroni	
In	 addition	 to	 ESMA’s	 quasi-regulatory	 mandate,	 it	 also	 has	 a	 suite	 of	 supervisory	
competences.	 As	 observed	 above,	 some	 of	 these	 are	 a	 notable	 advancement	 on	 those	
accorded	to	earlier	agencies,	such	as	the	ability	of	all	the	ESAs’	to	exercise	binding	decisions	
over	national	authorities.
51
		Some	of	ESMA’s	tasks	also	go	beyond	those	of	the	other	ESAs,	
such	 as	 ESMA’s	 direct	 day-to-day	 supervisory	 powers	 over	 particular	market	 participants,	
and	its	emergency	market	intervention	powers	in	relation	to	short	selling.
52
		
	
With	respect	to	the	Meroni	constraints,	the	CJEU	was	asked	to	assess	whether	the	conferral	
of	 ESMA’s	 powers	 to	 intervene	 and	 ban	 short	 selling	 in	 exceptional	 circumstances	 (under	
article	28	SSR)	was	compatible	with	Meroni.	The	UK	argued	that	article	28	SSR	was	unlawful	
because	the	criteria	as	to	when	ESMA	was	required	to	take	action	entailed	much	discretion.	
Further,	ESMA	was	given	a	wide	range	of	choices	as	to	what	measures	to	impose	and	these	
had	economic	policy	 implications.	 Further,	 even	 if	 article	28	did	not	 involve	ESMA	making	
macro-economic	policy	choices,	it	had	a	broad	discretion	as	regards	the	application	of	policy,	
as	in	Meroni	itself.
53
			
	
The	 CJEU	 again	 dismissed	 this	 plea	 but	 it	 did	 not	 reject	 Meroni	 outright.	 Rather,	 it	
considered	the	Meroni	principle	to	be	satisfied	as	the	powers	were	precisely	delineated	and	
amenable	 to	 judicial	 review,	 and	 that	 ESMA’s	 exercise	 of	 them	 was	 limited	 by	 various	
conditions	limiting	its	discretion.
54
	It	held	that	Meroni	was	still	good	law,	but	there	was	some	
mellowing	to	be	compatible	with	the	‘new	reality	of	agency	power’.
55
		
	
In	 light	 of	 the	 ruling,	 when	 ESMA’s	 quasi-rule	 making	 and	 supervisory	 powers	 are	 taken	
together,	it	is	evident	that	it	has	been	cut	from	different	cloth	to	earlier	agencies	and	comes	
closest	to	having	proper	autonomy.
56
	In	this	regard	the	CJEU’s	flexible	view	helped	place	 it	
(and	 its	 sibling	 ESAs)	 on	 a	 firmer	 constitutional	 footing.
57
	As	 Ferran	 argues,	 the	 CJEU	was	
likely	 also	 mindful	 of	 the	 broader	 canvas,	 specifically	 the	 clarification	 of	 the	 emerging	
European	Banking	Union’s	framework.
58
		At	the	same	time,	the	CJEU	did	not	take	the	more	
drastic	option	of	repealing,	or	revising	Meroni	in	the	light	of	this	changing	landscape.	It	also	
																																								 																				
51
	See	e.g.	Regulation	1095/2010,	arts	17-19.	
52
	See	e.g.	Regulation	(EU)	No	236/2012	on	Short	Selling	and	Certain	Aspects	of	Credit	Default	Swaps	
[2012]	OJ	L86/1,	art	28.	
53
	UK	v	Council	and	Parliament	(n	22)	paras	41-54.	
54
	Ibid.	
55
	Jacques	Pelkmans	and	Marta	Simoncini,	 ‘Mellowing	Meroni:	How	ESMA	Can	Help	Build	the	Single	
Market’	 (CEPS	Commentary,	 18	 February	 2014);	 Paul	 Craig,	UK,	 EU	and	Global	 Administrative	 Law:	
Foundations	and	Challenges	(n	27).	
56
	Paul	Craig,	UK,	EU	and	Global	Administrative	Law:	Foundations	and	Challenges	(n	27).	
57
	Heikki	Marjosola,	 ‘Bridging	 the	Constitutional	Gap	 in	EU	Executive	Rulemaking’,	 518;	Ellen	Vos	 (n	
13).		
58
	Eilis	 Ferran,	 ‘European	 Banking	 Union:	 Imperfect,	 but	 It	 Can	 Work’	 Cambridge	 Faculty	 of	 Law	
Research	 Paper	 No	 30/2014	 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2426247>	
accessed	20	July	2018.	
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chose	not	 to	 consider	whether	 the	powers	had	been	actually	 conferred	 rather	 than	being	
delegated	 to	 ESMA.
59
	Consequently,	 the	 ‘spectrum	 of	 permitted	 operational	 discretion	
remains	somewhat	fuzzy’.
60
	A	narrow	reading	frames	 its	outcome	on	the	precise	questions	
that	were	 put	 to	 the	CJEU;	 a	more	 liberal	 view	 suggests	 that	Meroni	has	 been	mellowed.	
One	way	or	other,	however,	the	greater	according	of	powers	to	new	EU	agencies	has	been	
constitutionally	 sanctioned	 to	 an	 extent,	 making	 further	 grants	 of	 power	 (within	 these	
confines)	more	likely.		
	
It	is	undoubtedly	important	that	the	EU’s	set-up	is	capable	of	developing	in	light	of	changing	
times	and	 the	new	reality	of	EU	governance.
61
		At	 the	same	time,	given	 that	ESMA	can	be	
making	 decisions	 (quasi-regulatory	 or	 supervisory)	 that	 may	 extend	 beyond	 the	 purely	
technical,	this	raises	the	related	issue	as	to	the	adequacy	of	ESMA’s	governance	structures,	
and	whether	it	is	subject	to	sufficient	oversight	mechanisms.
62
		
4 Governance	Structures		
	
4.1 ESMA:	Internal	Governance	Challenges	
	
EU	agencies	have	traditionally	(typically)	comprised	of	a	one-tier	governance	structure	with	
an	 executive	 director,	 an	 administrative	 (or	 management)	 board,	 plus	 the	 input	 of	 a	
scientific	 committee.
63
		 Administrative	 boards	 are	 responsible	 for	 ensuring	 the	 agency	
performs	 the	 tasks	 in	 their	 founding	 regulation.	 There	 are	 several	 variants	 but	 they	 are	
generally	made	up	of	a	Commission	representative	and	Member	State	representatives;	and	
the	scientific	committees	are	appointed	on	the	basis	of	expertise.
64
			
	
Examining	 ESMA	 (although	 the	 same	 framework	 applies	 to	 all	 three	 ESAs),	 its	 governance	
architecture	is	based	on	that	of	prior	agencies	to	an	extent	but	has	some	unique	features.
65
	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 orthodox	 framework,	 ESMA	 has	 a	 two-tier	 governance	 system.	 Its	
Management	 Board	 is	 charged	 with	 organisational	 issues	 such	 as	 budget	 and	 human	
																																								 																				
59
	Niamh	Moloney,	‘European	Banking	Union:	Assessing	Its	Risks	and	Resilience’	(2014)	51	CMLR	1609;	
UK	v	Council	and	Parliament	(n	37).	
60
	Niamh	Moloney,	‘European	Banking	Union:	Assessing	Its	Risks	and	Resilience’	(n	59).	
61
	Michelle	Everson	and	Ellen	Vos	(n	50).	
62
	Paul	Craig,	UK,	EU	and	Global	Administrative	Law:	Foundations	and	Challenges	(n	27);	Ellen	Vos	(n	
13).	
63
	Edoardo	 Chiti,	 ‘An	 Important	 Part	 of	 the	 EU's	 Institutional	 Machinery:	 Features,	 Problems	 and	
Perspectives	of	European	Agencies’	(2009)	46	CMLR	1395;	Commission,	European	Agencies	-	the	Way	
Forward	COM(2008)	135	Final	5.	
64
	Michelle	 Everson,	 A	 Technology	 of	 Expertise:	 EU	 Financial	 Services	 Agencies	 (LEQS	 Paper	 No	
49/2012,	June	2012);	Edoardo	Chiti,	‘An	Important	Part	of	the	EU's	Institutional	Machinery:	Features,	
Problems	and	Perspectives	of	European	Agencies’	(n	63).		
65
	Moloney,	EU	Securities	and	Financial	Markets	Regulation	(n	30)	chapter	X.5.2.2;	Everson	(n	64)	22.	
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resources,	 and	 its	Board	of	 Supervisors	 (the	 ‘Board’)	 is	 the	main	 rule	making	and	decision	
making	entity.
66
		
	
The	 Board	 is	 comprised	 of	 experts	 (the	 Member	 States	 via	 the	 heads	 of	 the	 national	
competent	authorities	(‘NCAs’)).	They	are	the	voting	members,	and	operate	under	a	simple	
majority	vote	apart	from	regarding	ESMA’s	quasi-rule	making	powers,	where	QMV	(a	system	
of	 weighted	 votes)	 applies.
67
	The	 Board	 also	 has	 non-voting	 members;	 specifically	 an	
independent	 Chairperson,	 and	 supranational	 representatives	 including	 a	 Commission	
representative	(in	line	with	traditional	agency	models),	plus	single	member	representatives	
from	the	other	ESAs	and	the	macro-prudential	European	Systemic	Risk	Board	that	oversees	
the	risk	to	the	financial	system	as	a	whole.	The	independent	Executive	Director	of	ESMA	may	
also	participate	in	the	meetings,	again	in	a	non-voting	capacity.
68
			
	
The	 Board’s	 technocratic	 nature	 is	 clear	 from	 its	 mandate;	 it	 is	 responsible	 for	 tasks	
including	giving	guidance	to	ESMA’s	work;	adopting	decisions,	the	work	plan,	annual	report	
and	 budget.
69
	The	 necessity	 of	 expert	 judgment	 is	 also	 underlined	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 the	
independent	 Chairperson,	 and	 Executive	 Director.	 Both	 are	 to	 be	 appointed	 following	 an	
open	 selection	 procedure	 on	 the	 basis	 of	merit,	 skills,	 knowledge	 and	 financial	 regulation	
experience	(with	the	Executive	Director	also	requiring	managerial	experience),	although	the	
Parliament	 may	 object	 to	 the	 Chairperson’s	 designation,	 and	 must	 confirm	 that	 of	 the	
Executive	Director.
70
	In	this	regard,	it	is	notable	that	there	were	significant	inter-institutional	
tensions	over	the	appointment	procedure	during	the	ESAs’	legislative	process,	including	with	
the	Parliament	suggesting	that	it	should	select	the	candidate	from	a	Commission	shortlist.
71
	
This	all	played	out	during	the	appointment	of	the	ESAs’	first	Chairpersons.	The	Commission	
was	 in	 charge	 of	 drawing	 up	 a	 short	 list	 and	 it	 added	 criteria	 not	 contemplated	 by	 the	
Regulations	(including	age	limit	and	administrative	ranking).	The	Parliament	criticised	this	for	
a	lack	of	transparency	and	the	ability	to	select	a	sufficient	number	of	candidates	(for	some	
ESAs,	the	short	list	was	of	one	name).
72
	
	
Such	 wrangling	 aside,	 the	 Board	 elects	 six	 NCA	 representatives	 from	 the	 Board	 plus	 the	
Chairperson	to	sit	on	ESMA’s	Management	Board.	There	is	the	right	for	the	Commission	and	
ESMA’s	 Executive	 Director	 to	 also	 participate	 in	 a	 non-voting	 capacity,	 although	 the	
Commission	has	a	right	to	vote	on	the	budget.
73
	ESMA	has	also	established	a	securities	and	
markets	stakeholder	group	(as	required	by	its	founding	regulation),	and	this	is	an	important	
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	Carmine	 Di	 Noia	 and	 Matteo	 Gargantini,	 ‘Unleashing	 the	 European	 Securities	 and	 Markets	
Authority:	 Governance	 and	 Accountability	 after	 the	 ECJ	 Decision	 on	 the	 Short	 Selling	 Regulation’	
(2014)	15	EBOR	1;	Commission,	Joint	Statement	on	Decentralised	Agencies	(2012)	5.	
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	Regulation	1095/2010,	art	44.	
68
	Ibid	art	40.		
69
	Ibid	art	43.		
70
	Ibid	art	48(2)	and	art	51(2);	Everson	(n	64).	
71
	Eilis	 Ferran,	 ‘Crisis-Driven	 Regulatory	 Reform:	 Where	 in	 the	 World	 Is	 the	 EU	 Going?’	 in	 The	
Regulatory	Aftermath	of	the	Global	Financial	Crisis	(CUP	2012)	76.	
72
	Mazars,	Review	of	 the	New	ESFS:	Study	 for	 the	European	Parliament's	ECON	Committee	 (October	
2013	(IP/A/ECON/ST/2012-23)),	section	2.1.3.	
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	Regulation	1095/2010,	art	63.	
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element	 of	 governance	 designed	 to	 facilitate	 consultation	 with	 market	 participants,	
consumers,	and	financial	services	users	and	providers.
74
			
	
ESMA’s	 governance	model	 has	 a	 strong	 focus	on	 independence	 in	 its	 founding	 regulation.	
This	 differs	 from	many	prior	 agencies,	where	 there	was	 considerable	 variation	 in	 the	way	
independence	 was	 tackled,	 if	 referenced	 at	 all.
75
	Yet	 independence	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 a	
relative	concept;	 the	notion	 is	not	entirely	 followed	through	with	the	structures	 in	place.
76
		
Specifically	 there	 is	 an	 inherent	 tension	 between	 ESMA’s	 European	 mandate	 versus	 the	
national	 remit	 of	 the	 NCAs	 that	 comprise	 the	 Board.	 As	 identified,	 ESMA’s	 independent	
Chairperson	has	a	non-voting	status,	and	the	Board’s	voting	members	are	the	heads	of	the	
NCAs.	 Given	 the	 Board	 is	 adopting	 measures	 addressed	 to	 the	 public	 authorities	 and	
financial	institutions	run	by	its	voting	members,
	
this	risks	bringing	national	interests	into	the	
equation	(termed	the	‘double	hat’	challenge).
77
	Such	conflicts	of	interest	are	also	heightened	
by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 national	 authorities	 are	 required	 to	make	 obligatory	 contributions	 to	
ESMA’s	revenues.		
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 reality	 is	 likely	 more	 nuanced.	 It	 does	 appear	 in	 practice	 that	 the	
major	 NCAs	 can	 heavily	 influence	 discussions	 and	 decisions,	 but	 this	 is	 balanced,	 to	 an	
extent,	by	the	QMV	influence.	Moreover,	with	respect	to	the	national	position,	authorities	
sometimes	adopt	self-serving	stances,	but	also	adopt	positions	congruent	with	the	European	
interest	 (such	 as	 that	 taken	 by	 the	 euro	 EBA	 members	 during	 the	 banking	 crises).	 All	 of	
which	points	to	the	question	of	the	national	versus	the	EU	interest	being	fluid.
78
	
	
Accordingly,	perhaps	more	problematic	are	the	competing	inter-institutional	pressures	that	
ESMA	faces,	especially	 from	the	Commission.	The	Commission’s	 involvement	 in	appointing	
the	Chairperson	and	Executive	Director	has	been	observed.	Its	representation	on	the	Board,	
the	Management	Board	(with	its	voting	capacity	on	the	budget),	plus	the	fact	it	contributes	
to	 ESMA’s	 funding	 via	 the	 EU	 budget)	 are	 also	 considerable	 institutional	 restraints.
79
		 As	
Moloney	identifies,	the	Commission	representative	plays	an	active	role	within	ESMA	and	can	
impact	on	proceedings,	including	expressing	concerns	where	actions	risk	conflicting	with	EU	
																																								 																				
74
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75
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Rope’	(2013)	19	ELJ	111,	120.	
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	Commission,	ESAs'	Review:	Proposal	COM(2017)	536	Final;	Madalina	Busuioc	(n	76)	121;		Ellen	Vos	
(n	13).	
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	Jennifer	 Payne,	 ‘Institutional	 Design	 for	 the	 EU	 Economic	 and	 Monetary	 Union:	 Financial	
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Elizabeth	Howell	
Cambridge	Law	Journal		
(Acceptance	version	February	2019)	
	
	 13	
measures.
80
	Ultimately,	 the	 Commission’s	 shadow	 looms	 large;	 this	 risks	 stifling	 ESMA’s	
relative	independence,	and	could	impede	its	performance.
81
		
	
4.2 Independence,	Control	and	Accountability	
	
Control	and	accountability	mechanisms	can	appear	at	odds	with	ESMA’s	 creation	given	 its	
need	to	be	 independent	and	at	arms	 length	from	the	EU	 institutions.
82
	Indeed,	historically,	
the	independence	of	unelected	agencies	was	an	important	legitimising	function	(even	if	this	
was	 not	 always	 referenced	 in	 their	 establishing	 acts).	 EU	 agencies	 have	 often	 been	
established	 to	 counter	 credible	 commitment	 failures	by	 the	Commission,	 and	 jeopardising	
independence	 would	 defeat	 the	 purpose	 for	 which	 they	 were	 created.
83
	Yet	 as	 agencies	
flourished	 and	 their	 powers	 increased,	 this	 generated	 rising	 anxiety	 about	 them	 escaping	
control	and	led	to	calls	for	increased	control	and	accountability.	Such	concerns	can	produce	
a	 catch	 22	 situation;	 control	 and	 accountability	 are	 difficult	 to	 reconcile	 with	
independence.
84
		Despite	this,	however,	as	Busuoic	and	Groenleer	argue,	and	in	line	with	the	
analysis	 above,	 in	 reality	 independent	 EU	 agencies	 do	 not,	 in	 fact,	 exist.	 	 Rather,	 non-
majoritarian	agencies	are	granted	a	degree	of	autonomy	 (or	 ‘relative’	 independence)	 from	
their	 ‘parent	 bodies’	 but	 not	 full	 freedom,	 and	will	 be	 subject	 to	 various	 constraints	 and	
restrictions.
85
	Hence,	 there	 is	 a	 balance	 to	 be	 struck	 between	 their	 independence	 and	
accountability	to	ensure	their	democratic	legitimacy	and	that	of	the	EU’s	more	generally.
86
		
	
The	 next	 issue	 is	what	 is	meant	 by	 accountability.	 Despite	 its	 central	 place	 in	 the	 agency	
debate,	there	can	sometimes	be	a	lack	of	clarity	about	the	concept.	In	the	agency	literature,	
definitions	 increasingly	 used	 include	 ‘the	 obligation	 to	 explain	 and	 justify	 conduct’;	 and	 a	
‘relationship	between	an	actor	and	a	forum,	in	which	the	actor	has	an	obligation	to	explain	
and	 justify	 his	 or	 her	 conduct,	 the	 forum	 can	pose	questions	 and	pass	 judgment,	 and	 the	
actor	may	 face	 consequences’.
87
		 These	definitions	differentiate	 ‘accountability’	 as	 ex	post	
systems;	versus	 ‘control’,	which	has	a	wider	dimension,	and	can	 include	ex	ante,	on-going,	
and	also	ex	post	ways	of	directing	behaviour.
88
		These	are	helpful	labels;	nonetheless	other	
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87
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Governance	Papers	No	C-06-01,	2006)	9;	Deirdre	Curtin,	‘Delegation	to	EU	Non-Majoritarian	Agencies	
and	Emerging	Practices	of	Public	Accountability’	in	D.	Gerardin	and	N.	Petit	(eds),	Regulation	through	
Agencies	in	the	EU,	a	New	Paradigm	of	European	Governance?	(Routledge	2005);	Ellen	Vos	(n	13).		
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commentators	 still	 use	 the	 terms	 in	 varying	 ways.	 Accordingly,	 this	 section	 considers	 the	
mechanisms	 used	 to	 control	 and	 hold	 ESMA	 accountable,	 whilst	 bearing	 in	 mind	 that	
elements	can	impact	at	more	than	one	level.
89
		
	
ESMA’s	 ex	 ante	 controls	 include	 the	 boundaries	 in	 its	 establishing	 regulation,	 such	 as	 the	
ambit	 of	 its	 powers	 and	 finances,	 and	 political	 controls	 in	 relation	 to	 appointments.	
Particularly	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 its	 activities	 and	 objectives,	 these	 are	 widely	
defined	in	its	founding	legislation.
90
		Although	this	can	be	valuable	in	conferring	ESMA	with	
operational	flexibility	in	practice,	as	discussed	below,	it	can	also	generate	related	challenges	
with	respect	to	ensuring	meaningful	ex	post	review	of	its	performance.	On-going	control	and	
accountability	 occurs	 through	 various	 channels,	 including	 the	 national	 authorities	 on	 the	
Board	 and	 Management	 Board,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Commission’s	 presence.
91
	Ex	 post	
accountability	arrangements	embrace	a	range	of	avenues.	Financial	mechanisms	include	the	
Commission’s	say	on	the	budget,	plus	further	arrangements.	For	instance,	ESMA	must	send	
budget	estimates	to	the	Commission	who	transmits	these	to	the	Parliament	and	Council,	in	
tandem	with	the	Commission	estimating	ESMA’s	subsidy.
92
	The	Commission	also	plays	a	role	
in	oversight	with	respect	to	ESMA’s	staff	employment	policies,	including	how	such	funds	are	
expended.
93
	Concerning	political	accountability,	ESMA	is	vertically	politically	accountable	to	
the	 Council	 and	 Parliament	 under	 its	 founding	 regulation,
94
	and	 is	 subject	 to	 considerable	
duties	 including	 reporting	 requirements	 (such	 as	 transmitting	 its	 work	 programmes	 for	
information,	 plus	 an	 annual	 report	 on	 its	 activities).
95
	ESMA	 also	 engages	more	 informally	
with	the	Parliament,	particularly	with	its	Economic	and	Monetary	Affairs	Committee.	On	the	
reviewability	 of	 decisions,	 a	 Joint	 Board	 of	 Appeal	 can	 decide	 appeals	 by	 affected	 parties	
against	decisions	taking	by	the	ESAs.
96
	These	can	also	be	appealed	to	the	CJEU	under	article	
263	 TFEU.
97
		 Extra	 judicial	 accountability	 encompasses	 quasi-judicial	 fora	 such	 as	 the	
European	Ombudsman.
98
	There	is	also	horizontal	accountability	within	the	Joint	Committee	
that	all	three	ESAs	participate	in	on	topics	where	their	competences	overlap	and	to	enable	
information	exchange	with	the	ESRB.
99
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Taken	 together,	 intricate	 and	 extensive	 governance,	 control,	 and	 accountability	
arrangements	 are	 in	 play	 ranging	 from	 the	 intergovernmental	 to	 the	 inter-institutional.		
These	 systems	 are	 also	 intertwined;	 accountability	 fora	 can	 act	 as	 ‘fire	 alarms’	 for	 other	
fora.
100
		 The	 resulting	 set-up	 is	 complex	 and	 not	 necessarily	 conducive	 to	 guaranteeing	
ESMA’s	 autonomy	 or	 its	 effective	 accountability.
101
		 Indeed	 in	 this	 regard,	 the	 ex	 ante	
legislative	framing	of	ESMA’s	tasks	and	objectives	in	somewhat	broad	and	vague	terms	can	
be	 regarded	 as	 a	 particular	 shortcoming	 in	 that	 it	 may	 risk	 severely	 limiting	 its	
accountability.
102
				
	
Early	 reviews	 of	 the	 ESA	 framework,	 including	 the	 IMF’s	 2013	 FSAP	 assessment,	 and	 the	
Parliament’s	 2013	 Mazars	 Review,	 reiterated	 many	 of	 these	 issues.	 These	 reports	
highlighted	 that	 aspects	 of	 ESMA’s	 design	 and	 operation	 should	 be	 reviewed	 as	 existing	
arrangements	 could	 inhibit	 its	 operational	 independence	 and	 proper	 accountability.
103
	In	
this	 regard,	 and	 as	 explored	 in	 section	 6	 below,	 the	 Commission’s	 2017	 Proposal	 now	
includes	 governance	 changes	 including	 transforming	 the	 Management	 Board	 into	 an	
independent	 Executive	 Board.	 Yet	 the	 Commission	 remains	 enmeshed	 in	 ESMA’s	 overall	
framework,	and	the	accountability	system	remains	largely	unchanged.	Accordingly,	although	
the	Proposal	may	contain	useful	initiatives	to	improve	ESMA’s	governance,	these	may	not	go	
far	enough.	Moreover,	particularly	as	ESMA	 is	being	accorded	 real	 and	 increasing	powers,	
the	argument	becomes	stronger	to	ensure	its	architecture	is	 in	 line	with	its	role,	as	well	as	
the	greater	levels	of	integrated	supervision	now	occurring	in	today’s	markets.
104
		
5 What	About	the	SSM?		
	
5.1 Eurozone	Supervisory	Structure:	Banks	
	
At	this	stage,	it	is	pertinent	to	contrast	ESMA’s	set-up	with	the	Banking	Union’s;	specifically	
the	SSM’s	governance	and	accountability	structures.	The	creation	of	the	Eurozone	Banking	
Union	is	a	‘genuine	novelty	both	at	the	constitutional	and	administrative	level’,	and	it	is	the	
product	of	very	specific	drivers.
105
		Given	this,	care	must	be	taken;	this	zone-specific	system	
is	not	necessarily	capable	of	being	directly	transplanted	to	the	pan-EU	financial	market.	At	
the	same	time,	the	Banking	Union’s	SSM	is	pertinent	for	examination	as	it	offers	important	
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and	 unprecedented	 ‘proof	 of	 concept’	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 centralisation	 of	 supervision.
106
	
Further,	it	is	valuable	to	consider	this	model	in	order	to	discern	whether	guidance	could	be	
drawn	 from	 it	 in	 relation	 to	ESMA,	particularly	with	 reference	 to	 the	heightened	 role	 that	
the	Parliament	plays	in	relation	to	the	SSM’s	oversight	mechanisms.		
	
It	 was	 the	 financial	 and	 sovereign	 debt	 crises	 that	 demonstrated	 that	 countries	 sharing	 a	
currency	were	 interdependent,	 increasing	the	 likelihood	of	cross-border	spillover	effects	 in	
the	 event	 of	 a	 bank	 crisis	 (the	 ‘doom	 loop’	 between	 banks	 and	 their	 sovereigns).
107
	The	
Banking	Union	was	forged	 in	the	aftermath	to	break	this	 link	and	to	avoid	taxpayers	being	
first	 in	 line	 to	 bail	 out	 ailing	 banks.
108
		 It	 creates	 special	 prudential	 supervision	 and	 bank	
resolution	 arrangements	 for	 the	 euro	 area	 via	 two	 pillars.	 The	 first	 pillar,	 the	 SSM,	 is	
overseen	 by	 an	 EU	 institution,	 the	 European	 Central	 Bank	 (‘ECB’),
109
	and	 the	 second,	 the	
Single	 Resolution	 Mechanisms	 (‘SRM’),	 is	 coordinated	 by	 the	 Single	 Resolution	 Board	
(‘SRB’).
110
	The	 mechanisms	 are	 mandatory	 for	 Eurozone	 countries	 and	 their	 banks;	 other	
Member	States	can	choose	to	participate	although	none	have	yet	done	so.	Under	the	SSM,	
the	ECB	has	direct	supervisory	responsibility	for	‘significant’	credit	institutions	(currently	119	
banking	 groups),	 and	 it	 oversees	 the	 national	 authorities’	 direct	 supervision	 of	 ‘less	
significant’	 banks	 (currently	 2869	 groups).
111
		 Under	 the	 SRM,	 there	 is	 a	 single	 resolution	
process	 that	 applies	 to	 all	 participating	 banks;	 this	 is	 coordinated	 by	 the	 SRB	 and	 a	
centralised	Single	Resolution	Fund	 to	support	 resolution.
112
		A	European	Deposit	 Insurance	
Scheme	 is	 also	 envisaged	 as	 a	 further	 pillar	 of	 the	 Banking	Union,	 but	 progress	 has	 been	
slow.
113
		
	
5.2 The	SSM:	Governance,	Control	and	Accountability		
	
The	ECB’s	 SSM	governance,	 control	 and	accountability	mechanisms	are	designed	 to	 tackle	
conflicts	 of	 interest	 that	 can	 arise	 with	 the	 ECB	 combining	 supervisory	 tasks	 with	 its	
monetary	 policy	 functions.
114
	The	 SSM	 Regulation	 articulates	 that	 monetary	 policy,	 and	
supervisory	 tasks	 under	 the	 SSM	 are	 separate.
115
		 In	 terms	 of	 governance	 structures,	 the	
SSM	comprises	of	a	Supervisory	Board	with	a	Chair	and	Vice	Chair,	four	ECB	representatives,	
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and	one	national	authority	representative	from	each	participating	country.
116
	The	Chair	and	
Vice	Chair	are	subject	to	ex	ante	controls;	are	appointed	by	the	Council	and	approved	by	the	
Parliament	on	the	basis	of	ECB	proposals	(the	Chair	on	the	basis	of	open	selection;	the	Vice	
Chair	 to	be	 chosen	 from	 the	members	of	 the	ECB’s	 Executive	Board).
117
	The	Chair	may	be	
removed	by	the	Council	on	specified	conditions,	following	an	ECB	proposal	and	Parliament’s	
approval.
118
	The	Parliament	or	Council	may	also	inform	the	ECB	that	they	consider	that	the	
conditions	for	removal	of	the	Chair	or	Vice	Chair	are	fulfilled	and	the	ECB	must	respond.
119
	
As	Ferran	and	Babis	identify,	the	increased	role	of	the	Parliament	in	these	procedures	was	a	
late	 addition,	 reflecting	 the	 concerns	 that	 the	 Supervisory	 Board	 would	 lack	 democratic	
accountability.
120
		
	
The	Supervisory	Board	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	planning	and	execution	of	 tasks	conferred	on	
the	 ECB	 (and	 largely	 operates	 on	 each	member	 having	 one	 vote	 with	 the	 Chair	 having	 a	
casting	vote),
121
	but	due	to	the	Treaty	constraints	(requiring	that	the	ECB	Governing	Council	
be	 the	ultimate	decision-maker),	 the	Board	 is	not	 able	 to	adopt	 formal	decisions.
122
	These	
must	be	sent	to	the	ECB’s	Governing	Council	for	adoption	(and	are	deemed	adopted	unless	
an	 objection	 is	 raised	 within	 a	 specified	 period).
123
	The	 ECB’s	 Governing	 Council	 is	 also	
responsible	for	monetary	policy	and	its	Member	State	members	are	Eurozone	central	bank	
governors;	 accordingly	 this	 violates	 the	 ‘ring	 fence’	 between	 monetary	 and	 supervisory	
policy.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 given	 the	 Treaty	 constraints,	 the	 structure	 can	 be	 considered	 a	
positive	and	pragmatic	solution.
124
		
	
In	 terms	 of	 on-going	 controls	 and	 accountability,	 the	 approach	 builds	 on	 the	 ECB’s	
accountability	 for	 monetary	 policy	 but	 introduces	 more	 demanding	 requirements	 with	
respect	 to	 its	 supervisory	 role.
125
	The	 ECB	 is	 accountable	 for	 its	 supervisory	 role	 to	 the	
Council	and	the	Parliament.
126
	There	are	regular	reporting	and	review	requirements,	which	
extend	to	include	the	Commission	and	the	Euro	Group.	Further,	the	Chair	may	be	asked	to	
appear	 before	 Parliament	 committees	 and	 the	 Euro	 Group,	 and	 the	 ECB	 must	 reply	 to	
questions	put	to	it	by	the	Euro	Group	or	Parliament.
127
		The	European	Court	of	Auditors	can	
also	take	into	account	the	supervisory	activities	of	the	ECB	when	it	examines	its	operational	
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2013).		
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	SSM	Regulation,	art	20(2)-(5).		
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efficiency.
128
	Further	 obligations	 apply	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 Parliament,	 including	 that	 the	
Chair	(upon	request)	hold	confidential	oral	discussions	with	the	Chair	and	Vice-Chair	of	the	
Parliament’s	competent	committees,	and	to	participate	in	any	Parliamentary	investigations,	
subject	 to	 the	 TFEU.
129
	As	 already	 witnessed,	 the	 Parliament’s	 role	 in	 appointing	 and	
removing	 the	 Chair	 or	 Vice	 Chair	 are	 additional	 controls.
130
	There	 are	 also	 reporting	
obligations	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 national	 Parliaments	 of	 participating	 Member	 States.
131
		
Further,	 the	 ECB	 is	 also	 bound	 by	 general	 due	 process	 requirements;	 there	 is	 an	
Administrative	 Board	 of	 Review	 that	 can	 review	 the	 ECB’s	 decisions;	 and	 acts	 can	 be	
reviewed	by	the	CJEU	under	articles	263	TFEU.
132
	
	
5.3 Independence	and	Accountability	Risks?	
	
A	 similar	 balancing	 act	 between	 independence	 and	 accountability	 pertains	 to	 the	 ECB’s	
supervisory	 functions,	 as	 witnessed	 above	 with	 ESMA.	 Moreover,	 from	 the	 analysis	 in	
section	5.2,	the	Parliament	has	ex	ante	control	and	ex	post	accountability	mechanisms	that	
extend	beyond	those	currently	 in	place	for	ESMA.	Although	these	checks	and	balances	can	
pose	a	risk	to	the	ECB’s	 independence,	 in	 line	with	section	4’s	observations,	 independence	
can	be	viewed	as	a	relative	rather	than	absolute	concept.
133
	In	particular,	independence	can	
relate	 to	 the	objectives	 of	 given	 tasks,	 and	different	 forms	of	 independence	 for	 the	 ECB’s	
supervisory	and	monetary	tasks	appear	justified.
134
		
	
This	affects	accountability.	As	Moloney	identifies,	it	is	hard	to	dismiss	that	the	Parliament’s	
ex	ante	role	 in	key	Supervisory	Board	appointments	and	its	range	of	ex	post	accountability	
mechanisms	 may	 constitute	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 ECB’s	 independence.	 Yet,	 although	 the	
Parliament	 plays	 a	 bigger	 role,	 the	 more	 serious	 challenge	 may	 stem	 from	 the	 ECB’s	
Governing	Council	 in	endorsing	the	Supervisory	Board’s	decisions.
135
	At	the	same	time,	this	
relationship	may	 again	 be	more	 nuanced	 than	 a	 simple	 trade-off	 between	 independence	
and	 accountability.
136
	In	 particular	 the	 two	 can	 potentially	 complement	 one	 another,	with	
accountability	 being	 capable	 of	 strengthening	 independence.
137
	Ultimately,	 it	 may	 come	
down	to	trying	to	find	a	delicate	balance	between	an	agency’s	independent	status	versus	the	
institutional	decisions	made	in	favour	of	accountability.
138
		In	this	regard,	as	Ferran	and	Babis	
																																								 																				
128
	Ibid	art	20(7).		
129
	Ibid	art	20(8)-(9).	
130
	Ibid	art	20(8);	Eilís	Ferran	and	Valia	Babis	(n	120).	
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	SSM	Regulation,	art	21.	
132
	Ibid	recitals	54	and	58;	arts	22	and	24.	
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	Ellen	Vos	(n	13);	Niamh	Moloney,	 ‘European	Banking	Union:	Assessing	Its	Risks	and	Resilience’	(n	
59).		
134
	G	 Ter	 Kuile,	 L	 Wissink	 and	 W	 Bovenschen,	 ‘Tailor-Made	 Accountability	 within	 the	 Single	
Supervisory	Mechanism’	(2015)	52	CMLR	155,	165;	Eilís	Ferran	and	Valia	Babis	(n	120).		
135
	Niamh	Moloney,	‘European	Banking	Union:	Assessing	Its	Risks	and	Resilience’	(n	59).		
136
	Fabian	Amtenbrink	and	Rosa	Lastra	(n	102)	121.	
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	G	 Ter	 Kuile,	 L	 Wissink	 and	 W	 Bovenschen	 (n	 134);	 see	 also	 Marc	 Quintyn,	 Silvia	 Ramirez	 and	
Michael	 W.	 Taylor,	 The	 Fear	 of	 Freedom:	 Politicians	 and	 the	 Independence	 and	 Accountability	 of	
Financial	Sector	Supervisors	(2007)	11.	
138
	Fabian	Amtenbrink	and	Rosa	Lastra	(n	102).		
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argue,	given	that	the	ECB	has	the	power	to	affect	the	interests	of	financial	institutions,	and	
the	financial	system	in	profound	ways,	its	accountability	framework	must	be	commensurate	
with	the	nature	and	extent	of	its	powers.
139
	
	
The	ECB/SSM	structure	may	not	be	perfect,	but	it	is	still	relatively	early	days	for	the	Banking	
Union	 and	 the	 governance	 and	 oversight	 mechanisms	 appear	 to	 be	 working	 relatively	
smoothly.	The	IMF	2018	FSAP	report	concluded	that	although	the	large	membership	of	the	
Supervisory	Board,	and	the	influence	of	national	interests	ran	the	risk	of	in-action	bias,	the	
Supervisory	Board	and	Governing	Council	had	demonstrated	the	ability	to	act	expeditiously	
in	emergency	situations.
140
	Moreover,	responding	to	concerns	raised	by	the	Commission,	the	
IMF	and	Court	of	Auditors	regarding	the	high	volume	of	decisions	being	taken,	(which	also	
included	calls	for	less	dependence	on	national	supervisors),	the	ECB	streamlined	its	decision-
making.
141
	This	included	implementing	a	delegation	framework	enabling	routine	decisions	to	
be	adopted	by	ECB	managerial	staff.
142
			
	
Reflecting	on	the	Parliament’s	increased	role	in	monitoring	the	SSM,	during	2017,	in	addition	
to	presenting	the	annual	report,	the	Chair	participated	in	three	public	hearings,	had	three	ad	
hoc	 exchanges	 of	 views	with	Members	 of	 the	 European	Parliament	 (‘MEPs’),	 and	 the	 ECB	
published	41	replies	to	MEPs	questions.
143
	In	this	regard,	a	qualitative	study	of	this	Banking	
Dialogue	suggested	that,	overall,	MEPs	raised	informed	questions,	although	with	a	‘notable	
deterioration’	of	mood	when	they	sensed	a	failure	of	the	SSM,	such	as	when	a	bank	ran	into	
difficulties.
144
	On	 this	 note,	 the	 SSM/SRM	 have	 certainly	 faced	 criticism	 as	 to	 their	
effectiveness,	 including	for	not	 intervening	earlier	with	respect	to	the	failure	of	two	Italian	
banks	 in	2017.	At	the	same	time,	the	criticisms	have	mainly	been	about	operational	rather	
than	 existential	 challenges.
145
	Certainly,	 recent	 Commission	 Proposals	 in	 December	 2017	
include	 visions	 for	 the	 ECB	 to	 supervise	 the	 largest,	 systemic	 investment	 firms	 under	 the	
SSM.	 This	 Proposal	 has	 clear	 ‘Brexit’-related	 connotations	 given	 that	 UK	 investment	 firms	
play	a	key	role	in	this	market	and	may	choose	to	relocate	due	to	Brexit.
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	Although	the	fate	
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	Eilís	Ferran	and	Valia	Babis	(n	120)	271.	
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	IMF,	 FSAP	 Technical	 Note:	 Assessment	 of	 Observance	 of	 Basel	 Principles	 for	 Effective	 Banking	
Supervision	No.18/233	(July	2018);	ECB	(n	111).		
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	European	 Court	 of	 Auditors,	 SSM	 –	 Good	 Start	 but	 Further	 Improvements	 Needed	 (2016)	 134;	
Commission,	Report	on	the	Single	Supervisory	Mechanism	COM(2017)	591	Final	(October	2017)	6.	
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	SSM	Supervisory	Manual	(March	2018);	ECB	Annual	Report	on	Supervisory	Activities:	2017	(March	
2018).	
143
	ECB	 (n	 111)	 section	 5.1;	 Fabian	 Amtenbrink	 and	 Menelaos	 Markakis,	 ‘Towards	 a	 Meaningful	
Prudential	Supervision	Dialogue	in	the	Euro	Area?	A	Study	of	the	Interaction	between	the	European	
Parliament	 and	 the	European	Central	Bank	 in	 the	 Single	 Supervisory	Mechanism’	 (ADEMU	Working	
Paper	2017/081).	
144
	Fabian	Amtenbrink	and	Menelaos	Markakis	(n	143).		
145
	‘ECB	 Supervisor	 Defends	 Role	 in	 Italian	 Banking	 Crisis’	 Financial	 Times	 (4	 July	 2017);	 cf	 ‘Banco	
Popular	 Process	 Is	 a	Model	 for	 Failing	 Banks’	 Financial	 Times	 (8	 June	 2017);	 Niamh	Moloney,	 ‘EU	
Financial	 Governance	 after	 Brexit:	 The	 Rise	 of	 Technocracy	 and	 the	 Absorption	 of	 the	 UK's	
Withdrawal’	(n	78)	82,	96.	
146
	Niamh	 Moloney,	 ‘Brexit	 and	 Financial	 Services:	 (yet)	 Another	 Re-Ordering	 of	 Institutional	
Governance	for	the	EU	Financial	System?’	(2018)	55	CMLR	175,	192-3.	
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of	this	initiative	is	by	no	means	clear,	its	ambition	certainly	reinforces	rather	than	calls	into	
question	the	future	of	the	ECB/SSM.
147
					
	
Taken	 together	 the	 SSM	has	been	designed	 specifically	 as	 a	 single	 supervision	mechanism	
for	Eurozone	banks,	providing	empirical	evidence	of	integrated	supervision.
148
	Yet	there	are	
numerous	 difficulties,	 ranging	 from	 the	 political	 to	 the	 constitutional,	 in	 simply	 extending	
this	mechanism	to	the	EU’s	capital	markets.	Moreover,	the	ECB/SSM	is	 in	a	more	powerful	
position	 than	 ESMA;	 as	 a	 Treaty	 institution,	 the	 ECB	 has	 power	 and	 authority	 that	 flows	
directly	 from	 this	 status,	 and	 so	 any	 SSM/ESMA	 comparisons	 can	 only	 be	 taken	 so	 far.
149
	
Nonetheless,	beneficial	insights	can	still	be	gleaned	from	the	SSM’s	architecture,	particularly	
when	reflecting	on	ESMA’s	future	role	(not	least	when	bearing	in	mind	that	ESMA	may	have	
some	 ambition	 to	 eventually	 frame	 itself	 as	 type	 of	 financial	 market	 equivalent	 to	 the	
ECB/SSM).
150
		 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 Parliament	 serving	 as	 an	 accountability	 forum	 via	 the	
Banking	 Dialogue	 is	 noteworthy.
151
	As	 Curtin	 argues,	 part	 of	 the	 Parliament’s	 strategy	
appears	to	be	developing	its	position	as	a	visible	forum	for	critically	debating	agency	actions;	
and	 this	 role	 has	 been	expanding	 in	 recent	 years.
152
		 Accordingly,	 and	 as	 sections	 6	 and	7	
explore,	the	Parliament	could	be	utilised	further	as	a	channel	for	holding	ESMA	to	account.		
6 ESMA:	Governance	Initiatives	
	
6.1 The	Commission’s	Proposal	
	
The	 supervisory	 structure	across	 the	EU	 is	now	one	of	 variable	geometry.	 For	 the	banking	
sector,	the	Eurozone’s	supervisory	set-up	 is	highly	 integrated,	with	major	roles	for	the	ECB	
and	 the	 national	 central	 bank	 representatives	 for	 Eurozone-bank	 supervision.
153
	In	 the	
financial	 sector,	 supervision	 continues	 to	 be,	 mainly,	 a	 Member	 State	 responsibility,	
although	 ESMA’s	 powers	 and	 responsibilities	 are	 increasing.	 The	 Commission’s	 2017	
Proposal	 sets	 out	 a	 suite	 of	 reforms,	 including	 to	 the	 ESAs’	 governance	 and	 funding	
arrangements	 (as	 discussed	 below),	 enhancements	 to	 their	 supervisory	 convergence	
powers,	as	well	as,	for	ESMA,	new	direct	supervisory	responsibilities	over	a	range	of	sectors	
and	actors	(including	in	relation	to	certain	prospectuses,	and	particular	types	of	EU	fund).	A	
connected	 2017	 Central	 Clearing	 Counterparties	 (‘CCPs’)	 Proposal	 also	 envisages	 ESMA	
having	direct	supervisory	and	enforcement	competences	over	third	country	CCPs,	as	well	as	
strengthening	ESMA’s	role	over	EU	CCPs.
154
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If	the	Commission’s	2017	ESA	Proposal	is	adopted	in	its	current	form	(which,	as	is	considered	
below,	is	by	no	means	clear),	it	will	represent	a	substantial	expansion	to	ESMA’s	powers	and	
follow	 the	 trend	 towards	ESMA	emerging	as	a	distinct	 supervisory	authority.	The	Proposal	
would	further	bolster	ESMA’s	presence	within	the	EU	financial	markets,	extend	its	influence	
in	particular	sectors,	and	could	also	send	clear	signalling	effects	to	NCAs	with	respect	to	its	
strengthened	 authority.
155
		Moreover,	 in	 contrast,	 the	 other	 two	 ESAs	 are	 not	 blazing	 the	
same	trail;	they	are	on	different	trajectories.
	156
	Unlike	ESMA	they	do	not	have	any	powers	of	
direct	supervision,	and	can	be	perceived	more	as	 instruments	for	assisting	the	Commission	
with	 technical	 rule	 making,	 and	 in	 achieving	 supervisory	 convergence.	 Accordingly,	 given	
ESMA’s	slow	and	steady	evolution	as	a	type	of	EU-supervisory	authority	that	is	separate	to	
the	other	ESAs,	this	raises	the	question	whether	there	should	be	a	greater	recalibration	of	its	
governance	and	oversight	 framework	 to	 reflect	 this.
157
	As	ESMA	 takes	on	a	 life	of	 its	own,	
the	argument	becomes	more	compelling	for	it	to	have	its	own	bespoke	arrangements.
158
	
	
6.2 Governance	and	Funding	Proposals	
	
The	Proposal’s	headline	changes	envisage	an	alteration	of	ESMA’s	governance	structure	to	
make	 it	more	 assertive	 vis-à-vis	 the	 national	 authorities.	 Linked	 to	 this,	 the	 Proposal	 also	
proposes	eliminating	 the	national	authority	contributions	and	replacing	 it	with	an	 industry	
levy.		
	
On	the	specifics,	the	Proposal	replaces	the	current	Management	Board	with	an	independent	
Executive	 Board	 comprising	 five	 full-time	 members	 (with	 one	 acting	 as	 Vice-Chair)	 and	
ESMA’s	 Chairperson.	 The	 current	 role	 of	 Executive	 Director	 is	 eliminated	 and	 those	
responsibilities	assumed	a	full-time	member.
159
	In	contrast	to	the	current	model	(where	the	
Management	 Board	 is	 elected	 by	 the	 Board	 of	 Supervisors	 and	 is	 dominated	 by	 national	
authorities),	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 full-time	 members	 is	 to	 be	 based	 on	 an	 open	 call	 for	
applicants	who	are	appointed	by	the	Council,	subject	to	Parliament	approval.
160
		Decisions	in	
the	Executive	Board	are	to	be	by	simple	majority	and	each	member	has	one	vote,	with	the	
Chairperson	getting	a	casting	vote	 (as	before,	 the	Commission	participates	 in	a	non-voting	
capacity	 except	 the	 right	 to	 vote	 on	 the	 budget).
161
	There	 are	 clarifications	 to	 the	 Chair’s	
appointment	procedure.	The	Chair	is	to	be	appointed	on	the	basis	of	an	open	call	organised	
by	the	Commission;	the	Parliament	shall	approve	the	Commission’s	shortlist,	and	the	Council	
shall	appoint	via	a	QMV	decision.
162
		On	accountability,	the	Proposal’s	recitals	state	that	the	
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EU	pension	product	proposals),	this	will	take	time.	The	EBA’s	structure	is	also	fundamentally	impacted	
by	 the	 SSM’s	 introduction	 and	 the	 ECB’s	 shadow	 looms	 large	 over	 it	 Eilís	 Ferran,	 ‘The	 Existential	
Search	of	the	European	Banking	Authority’	(2016)	17	EBOR	285.	
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Chair	and	Executive	Board	are	accountable	to	the	Parliament	and	Council	for	any	decisions	
taken	on	the	basis	of	its	founding	Regulation.
163
	Other	than	this,	however,	such	mechanisms	
are	not	tackled	further	in	the	Proposal.	
	
The	Executive	Board’s	main	function	is	also	to	be	expanded;	as	well	as	preparing	the	Board	
of	 Supervisors’	work	 programme	 and	 budget,	 it	will	 prepare	 decisions	 to	 be	 taken	 by	 the	
Board	of	Supervisors.	This	is	to	facilitate	quicker,	more	streamlined	decision-making,	and	an	
approach	that	 is	more	EU-oriented.	The	Executive	Board	 is	also	attributed	some	important	
decision-making	 powers	 in	 relation	 to	 non-regulatory	 matters.	 These	 are	 geared	 towards	
reducing	 the	power	of	 the	Board	of	 Supervisors	 and	 the	 risk	of	 influence	arising	 from	 the	
national	mandate	of	the	NCAs	on	the	Board.	Such	proposals	dilute	the	power	of	the	Board	
where	there	could	be	conflicts	of	interest	(such	as	relating	to	actions	being	brought	against	a	
NCA)	and	places	these	decisions	with	the	Executive	Board.
164
		The	Executive	Board	is	also	to	
be	 in	 charge	 of	 setting	 out	 supervisory	 priorities	 for	 NCAs	 via	 Strategic	 Supervisory	 Plans;	
these	 are	 to	 check	 the	 consistency	 of	 national	 authorities’	 work	 programmes	 with	 EU	
priorities	 and	 to	 review	 their	 implementation.
165
		Under	 the	 related	expansions	 to	 ESMA’s	
supervisory	 powers	 under	 the	 CCP	 Proposal,	 an	 additional	 ‘Executive	 Session’	 is	 to	 be	
introduced	 to	work	alongside	 the	Executive	Board.	This	will	 comprise	of	permanent	newly	
appointed	members,	NCAs	responsible	for	CCPs,	and	with	the	ECB	or	other	relevant	central	
bank	of	issue,	and	the	Commission	as	non-voting	members.
166
	
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Board	 of	 Supervisors	 remains	 the	 main	 body	 in	 charge	 of	 overall	
guidance	and	decision-making	(save	for	those	decisions	transferred	to	the	Executive	Board),	
and	 the	 Commission’s	 presence	 remains	 undiminished.	 The	 Board’s	 composition	 is	 to	 be	
amended	to	include	the	full	time	members	of	the	Executive	Board	although	these	members	
will	not	have	voting	rights	(whether	on	the	quasi-regulatory	QMV	issues,	or	on	supervisory	
matters	 where	 voting	 is	 by	 simple	 majority).
167
	The	 Chair	 also	 remains	 non-voting.	
Nonetheless,	 there	 is	 an	 element	 of	 erosion	 to	 the	 Board’s	 position;	 in	 situations	 where	
ESMA	exercises	powers	of	direct	supervision,	the	Board	will	only	be	able	to	reject	a	proposal	
from	the	Executive	Board	by	a	qualified	majority.
168
		
	
In	 light	 of	 the	 proposed	 changes,	 the	 Commission	 also	 suggests	 amendments	 to	 ESMA’s	
funding.	 	 It	proposes	 retaining	 the	EU	 funding,	but	 instead	of	 collecting	national	 authority	
contributions,	 it	advocates	combining	EU	funding	with	that	of	 industry	(while	retaining	the	
fees	 ESMA	 receives	 from	 entities	 subject	 to	 direct	 supervision,	 with	 provisions	 to	 avoid	
double	 charges).
169
	The	 budgetary	 demands	 from	 ESMA	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 existing	
accountability	 and	 audit	mechanisms,	 as	would	 the	 annual	 decision	on	 the	 EU’s	 balancing	
contribution	to	ESMA.
170
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As	 observed,	 the	 Proposal	 is	 testament	 to	 ESMA’s	 steady	 rise.	 The	 Commission	 roots	 it	
within	 wider	 moves	 ‘towards	 a	 Single	 European	 Capital	 Markets	 Supervisor’	 (whilst	
tempering	 this	 by	 the	 subsidiarity	 principle	 and	 the	 continued	 role	 of	 the	 national	
authorities).
171
	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Proposal	 has	 been	 contested.	 The	 funding	 and	
governance	initiatives	significantly	strengthen	ESMA’s	bureaucratic	capacity	and	reduce	the	
decision-making	powers	of	 the	national	authorities	within	 it.
172
	Some	countries,	 industries,	
and	 firms	 have	 taken	 strong	 stances	 against	 it.
173
	Industry	 concerns	 include	 the	 shift	 in	
funding	 from	 the	 public	 sector	 to	 market	 participants.
174
	Further	 flashpoints	 concern	 the	
composition	 and	 process	 for	 appointing	 the	 full-time	 members	 of	 the	 Executive	 Board,	
which	could	dilute	the	influence	of	the	national	authorities.	Equally,	the	role	of	the	Executive	
Board	 in	 the	 Strategic	 Supervisory	 Plans	 also	 risks	 limiting	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	 national	
regulators.
175
	The	connected	CCP	governance	proposals	may	also	 face	 resistance,	not	 least	
for	the	increased	complexity	the	Executive	Session	introduces	into	the	overall	framework.
176
		
	
Given	 these	 various	 tensions,	 it	 is	 notable	 that	 the	 2019	 Council	 Compromise	 Proposal,	
which	forms	the	basis	of	the	trilogue	negotiations	with	the	Parliament,	is	more	restrained	in	
its	 ambition.	 This	 retains	 the	Management	 Board	 (whilst	 reinforcing	 its	 role	 and	 powers),	
and	 broadly	 preserves	 the	 existing	 funding	 structure.
177
		 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	
legislation’s	ultimate	 form	remains	a	matter	of	 speculation,	yet	at	 the	same	time,	 it	 raises	
the	 related	normative	 question:	 if	 ESMA	 is	 evolving	 into	 a	 type	of	 single	 supervisor,	what	
should	that	mean	in	terms	of	its	governance	and	accountability	mechanisms?	
7 The	Rise	of	ESMA	
	
7.1 ESMA:	Mind	the	Gap	Between	the	Model	and	the	Reality?	
	
The	 rationale	 of	 the	 financial	 sector	 ESAs	 complements	 the	wider	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 EU	
order	 of	 agencificiation.
178
	In	 this	 space,	 ESMA’s	 emergence	within	 the	 ESAs’	 as	 an	 astute	
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and	ambitious	authority	is	indicative	of	the	EU’s	strengthening	technocratic	capacity.	At	the	
same	time,	it	also	fleshes	out	the	widening	of	the	gap	between	the	model	of	EU	agencies	as	
originally	conceived,	and	the	reality	of	ESMA’s	position.	This	 includes,	as	witnessed	above,	
the	 ability	 of	 ESMA	 to	make	 quasi-regulatory	 choices	 via	 its	 rule-making	 competences,	 its	
direct	supervisory	competency,	and	its	powers	to	impose	decisions	binding	on	third	parties.		
	
As	Craig	argues,	this	raises	important	questions	with	respect	to	the	role	of	agencies	in	the	EU	
order.	Specifically,	even	if	it	is	accepted	that	a	mellowing	of	Meroni	took	place	via	the	Short	
Selling	 ruling,	 justifications	 for	 transferring	 powers	 based	 on	 agency	 independence,	
expertise	 and	 credibility	 become	 weaker	 when	 EU	 agencies	 are	 being	 accorded	 real	
discretionary	powers,	which	may	 include	policy	elements.
179
		At	the	same	time,	 it	does	not	
follow	from	this	that	recourse	to	agencies	is	incorrect,	especially	when	one	bears	in	mind	the	
magnitude	of	the	EU	project	and	the	Commission’s	limited	resources.	Yet,	it	becomes	all	the	
more	vital	 that	 such	agencies	are	 subject	 to	effective	 checks	and	balances	 to	ensure	 their	
continued	credibility	and	legitimacy.
180
	In	this	regard,	there	is	the	related	puzzle	for	ESMA’s	
governance	 mechanisms.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 its	 mandate	 requires	 technical	 expertise	 and	
autonomy	to	operate;	at	the	same	time,	as	an	unelected	entity	it	must	have	robust	oversight	
mechanisms	to	ensure	its	enduring	legitimacy.
181
			
	
Accordingly,	 this	 section	 speculates	 that	 although	 the	 governance	 reforms	 in	 the	
Commission	 Proposal	 may	 have	 some	 value,	 they	 neither	 fully	 tackle	 the	 shifts	 occurring	
towards	greater	centralisation,	nor	adequately	respects	the	position	of	NCA	experts	on	the	
current	 Board	 of	 Supervisors.	 Given	 this,	 it	 advocates	 further	 refinements	 to	 ESMA’s	
governance	 framework,	 including	 reducing	 the	 Commission’s	 presence	 to	 avoid	 stifling	 its	
autonomy.	 In	 relation	 to	 legitimation	 concerns,	 and	 drawing	 on	 the	 SSM	 case	 study,	 it	
proposes	 that	 there	 could	 be	 a	 greater	 role	 allocated	 to	 the	 Parliament	 with	 respect	 to	
ESMA’s	 oversight	mechanisms.	 ESMA	 is	 politically	 accountable	 to	 the	 Parliament,	 and	 the	
Parliament	 currently	 lacks	 representation	 on	 ESMA’s	 governing	 bodies.	 Moreover	 as	 a	
directly	 elected	 EU	 institution,	 the	 Parliament	 is	 an	 important	 institutional	 contact	 for	
ensuring	ESMA’s	democratic	accountability.
182
	It	is	also	the	institution	playing	an	increasingly	
significant	 role	 as	 a	 forum	 for	 holding	 unelected	 agencies	 to	 account.	 In	 this	 regard,	
increased	 monitoring	 by	 the	 Parliament	 could	 better	 guarantee	 ESMA’s	 continued	
legitimacy.		
	
7.2 Some	Proposed	Refinements		
	
As	 observed	 in	 section	 6,	 the	 Commission	 Proposal’s	 governance	 modifications	 envisage	
creating	 an	 independent	 Executive	 Board	 geared	 at	 impartial	 and	 EU-oriented	 decision-
making.	 The	 locating	 of	 certain	 decisions	 in	 the	 Executive	 Board	 is	 designed	 to	 dilute	 the	
Board	 of	 Supervisor’s	 power	 where	 it	 may	 be	 in	 conflict.	 The	 Board	 remains	 the	 main	
intergovernmental	 body	 largely	 in	 charge	 of	 decision-making,	 however,	 and	 ESMA’s	
executive	members	do	not	have	voting	 rights	 in	 the	Board.	There	are	operational	changes	
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advocated	 concerning	 the	 Chair’s	 appointment	 and	 profile;	 and	 the	 funding	 amendments	
seek	to	reduce	the	risk	of	national	interference	through	eliminating	national	contributions.		
	
It	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 strike	 the	 right	 balance	 between	 the	 Member	 States’	 heterogeneous	
interests	and	those	of	the	supranational.	The	Commission’s	Proposal	draws,	to	an	extent,	on	
the	 Parliament’s	 Mazars	 recommendations,	 and	 especially	 from	 an	 efficacy	 perspective,	
could	have	some	value.
183
	At	the	same	time,	with	respect	to	the	moves	observable	towards	
greater	centralised	supervision,	the	Proposal	could	also	have	gone	further,	such	as	granting	
the	 full-time	 Executive	 Board	members	 a	 vote	 in	 the	 Board	 of	 Supervisors	 on	 supervisory	
matters.
184
		 Yet,	 any	 such	 ESMA-shaped	 developments,	 which	 push	 in	 the	 direction	 of	
bureaucratic	centralisation,	could	then	be	balanced	through	further	increasing	the	Board	of	
Supervisors’	decision-making	and	oversight	tasks.
185
	In	line	with	the	analysis	in	section	4,	it	is	
not	 necessarily	 the	 case	 that	 the	 NCAs	 in	 the	 Board	 always	 adopt	 self-serving	 national	
positions.	Moreover,	 the	 NCAs	 are	 expert	 and	 closest	 to	 the	 risks	 ESMA	 has	 to	 tackle.
186
	
Accordingly,	 and	 as	 Moloney	 argues,	 additional	 enhancements	 to	 the	 Board’s	 role	 could	
involve	 the	 use	 of	 expert	 Board	 committees	 to	 analyse	 particular	 decisions	 prior	 to	 their	
adoption;	wider	use	of	QMV	 to	ensure	 greater	Board	 interaction;	plus	 the	 introduction	of	
additional	 oversight	 mechanisms	 to	 challenge	 both	 the	 Executive	 and	 the	 Board	 where	
necessary.
187
		Although	the	resulting	set-up	could	run	the	risk	of	becoming	overly	complex,	it	
could	help	to	support	the	centralised	direction	of	travel	of	the	ESMA	project	via	ensuring	the	
continued	input,	expertise,	and	monitoring	ability	of	the	NCAs.	
	
At	 the	 level	 of	 the	 international	 arena,	 taking	 account	 of	 ESMA’s	 presence	 within	
international	standard	setting	bodies,	additional	enhancements	to	the	Chair’s	profile	would	
seem	sensible.
188
	Moreover	ESMA	has	considerable	influence	(which	is	likely	to	increase	due	
to	Brexit)	with	respect	 to	third	country	supervisors.
189
		 In	 this	 regard,	as	 the	Chair	 is	set	 to	
become	 a	 much	 more	 powerful	 player,	 this	 needs	 factored	 into	 the	 level	 of	 their	
administrative	 ranking	 and	 selection	procedure.	 Paring	back	 the	Commission’	 input	 in	 this	
process	 would	 also	 seem	 prudent,	 particularly	 given	 the	 debacle	 witnessed	 above	
surrounding	 the	 appointment	 of	 the	 ESAs’	 first	 Chairpersons.
190
	The	 Parliament	 could	 also	
play	 a	 greater	 ex	 ante	 role,	 providing	 democratic	 weight	 to	 the	 process,	 whether	 via	
assistance	in	preparing	the	short-list,	or	in	co-approving	the	Council’s	appointment.	
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7.3 Ensuring	ESMA’s	Autonomy…?	
	
Considering	 the	Commission’s	position	more	generally,	 its	presence	 in	ESMA’s	governance	
structure	 is	 complex.	 	 ESMA	 is	 not	 formally	 accountable	 to	 the	 Commission,	 and	 the	 two	
have	a	close	working	relationship.	Yet	the	Commission	has	considerable	influence	(a	type	of	
teacher-pupil	 dynamic),	which	 can	 risk	 impacting	 on	 ESMA’s	 operational	 freedom,	 and	 its	
presence	 remains	 unchanged	 in	 the	 ESA	 Proposal.
191
	One	 option	 would	 be	 for	 the	
Commission’s	 influence	 to	 be	 diluted	 by	 the	 addition	 of	 Parliament	 representation	within	
ESMA’s	governing	bodies.	 In	 line	with	 the	analysis	 in	 section	3,	 and	as	Craig	 argues,	 given	
that	 ESMA’s	 quasi-regulatory	 and	 supervisory	 mandate	 can	 blur	 the	 line	 between	 the	
technical	and	 the	policy,	 it	 is	not	 readily	apparent	why	 the	Parliament	should	be	excluded	
from	 exercising	 influence	 alongside	 the	 Commission.
192
		 Yet	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 could	
heighten	 the	 risk	 of	 inter-institutional	 wrangling	 within	 ESMA	 whilst	 further	 reducing	 its	
autonomy.	 Accordingly,	 an	 alternative	 could	 be	 to	 recalibrate	 the	 existing	
Commission/ESMA	 relationship	 so	 it	 becomes	 less	 burdensome	 for	 ESMA’s	 independence	
(such	 as	 removing	 the	 Commission	 from	 ESMA’s	 governance	 structures	 in	 relation	 to	
supervisory	 issues).	This	could	then	be	balanced	via	ESMA	being	held	formally	accountable	
for	such	decisions	to	the	Commission.			
	
7.4 …Subject	to	Guaranteeing	ESMA’s	Continued	Legitimacy?	
	
In	a	similar	vein,	any	such	shifts	need	to	be	tempered	by	implementing	appropriate	checks	
and	balances	to	ensure	ESMA’s	legitimacy.	Although	the	2017	Proposal	largely	advocates	no	
substantive	 amendments	 to	 ESMA’s	 accountability	 structures,	 inspiration	 could	 be	 drawn	
from	 the	 SSM.	 Any	 such	 comparisons	 have	 to	 be	made	 with	 a	 firm	 eye	 on	 their	 distinct	
environments,	 yet,	 the	 SSM	provides	 a	 paradigm	of	 integrated	 supervision,	 and,	 although	
not	immune	from	controversy,	is	bedding	in.	As	noted	above,	the	SSM	is	subject	to	on-going	
‘police	 patrol’	 as	 well	 as	 a	 range	 of	 accountability	 demands	 to	 the	 Parliament.
193
		
Accordingly,	 augmenting	 ESMA’s	 accountability	 in	 this	way	 to	 Parliament	would	 recognise	
the	 Parliament’s	 position	 as	 the	 one	 directly	 elected	 institution,	 which	 currently	 lacks	
representation	in	ESMA’s	governing	bodies.	Moreover,	ESMA	is	already	primarily	politically	
accountable	to	the	Parliament	as	one	of	its	principals	(in	conjunction	with	the	Council);	and	
bolstering	the	Parliament’s	position	would	accord	with	its	evolving	role	as	an	accountability	
forum	for	overseeing	EU	agencies’	performance.
194
				
	
The	starting	point	should	be	greater	ex	ante	 legislative	specification	of	ESMA’s	scope	of	its	
activities	 and	 objectives	 (whilst	 remaining	 mindful	 of	 the	 particular	 dynamics	 of	 financial	
market	oversight,	and	ESMA’s	 location	within	this),	 to	 form	a	clear	yardstick	against	which	
ESMA	 is	 to	 be	 assessed.
195
	This	 should	 help	 to	 protect	 against	 concerns	 as	 to	 arbitrary	
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evaluation	or	the	risk	of	interactions	turning	into	political	score	settling.
196
	Further,	in	light	of	
ESMA’s	expanding	competencies,	more	 formal,	 regular	appearances	before	 the	Parliament	
should	 be	 implemented.	 A	 form	 of	 Capital	 Markets	 Dialogue	 could	 be	 introduced	 via	
channels	 to	 include	more	 standardised	public	 hearings,	workshops,	 as	well	 as	maintaining	
current	 practices	 (such	 as	 more	 ad	 hoc	 exchanges	 of	 view	 with	 MEPs).	 In	 line	 with	 the	
analysis	 in	 section	 4,	 such	 fora	 could	 require	 ESMA	 and	 the	 Chair	 to	 explain	 and	 justify	
particular	 conduct	 or	 inaction	 to	 the	 Parliament	 on	 a	 regular	 basis;	 and	 facilitate	 rigorous	
questioning	and	informed	debate.	This	Dialogue	could	also	eventually	lead	to	judgment,	and	
for	ESMA,	where	necessary,	to	face	consequences	in	the	case	of	malperformance.
197
	In	this	
regard,	developing	an	enhanced	and	fruitful	ESMA/Parliament	relationship	should	not	prove	
too	onerous	a	 challenge	given	 that	ESMA	has	 sought	 to	develop	a	productive	 relationship	
with	the	Parliament	since	day	one	of	ESMA’s	creation,	and	has	strengthened	its	engagement	
with	it	over	the	years.
198
		
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 paper	 is	 not	 promoting	 a	 ‘SSM	 for	 Capital	Markets’.	 Although	 the	
general	direction	of	travel	may	ultimately	point	that	way,	this	paper	has	analysed	political,	
legal,	 and	 institutional	 obstacles	 that	 stand	 in	 the	way.	 These	 include	how	 far	Meroni	 has	
been	mellowed,	how	much	article	114	TFEU	can	bend	before	Treaty	 change	 is	needed,	as	
well	 as	 the	 ‘bewildering	 array’	 of	 design	 choices	with	 respect	 to	 how	 to	 split	 supervisory	
responsibilities	between	 the	ESAs,	and	 the	ECB	 in	 the	Banking	Union.
199
	Rather,	 given	 that	
ESMA	 is	becoming	a	different	 type	of	authority	 from	 the	other	ESAs,	 the	paper	advocates	
embracing	bespoke	governance	and	accountability	reforms	within	existing	EU	constraints	to	
ensure	these	frameworks	are	fit	for	purpose.	The	paper	remains	mindful	of	the	more	open	
questions	as	to	whether	the	Parliament’s	political	priorities	and	designs	are	always	going	to	
be	in	line	with	those	of	ESMA’s	and	financial	market	oversight.	Yet,	it	has	also	demonstrated	
that	a	plethora	of	other	inter-institutional	and	intergovernmental	monitoring	systems	are	in	
place	 to	 temper	any	grand	designs	by	 the	Parliament.	This	 is	 true	of	EU	governance	more	
generally;	 the	 reality	 today	 illustrates	 a	 combination	 of	 intergovernmental,	 supranational	
and	regulatory	relations	are	in	place,	and	none	of	these	can	be	confined	to	‘neat	single-level	
interactions’.
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8 Conclusion	
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Agencies	are	integral	aspects	of	the	EU’s	architecture	today;	they	are	an	established	part	of	
how	 the	 EU	 operates.
201
	In	 recent	 years,	 agencies	 have	mushroomed,	 and	 ESMA	 now	 has	
far-reaching	 quasi-regulatory	 and	 supervisory	 powers.	 Such	 shifts	 raise	 fundamental	
questions	with	respect	to	its	constitutional	standing,	the	powers	that	can	be	delegated	to	it,	
and	how	to	wrestle	the	competing	challenges	of	its	autonomy	and	accountability.	This	paper	
has	 charted	 the	 rise	 of	 ESMA	within	 the	 agency	 literature,	 and	 via	 an	 examination	 of	 its	
governance	 and	 accountability	 mechanisms,	 as	 well	 as	 drawing	 on	 the	 SSM’s	 operating	
systems,	makes	normative	proposals	for	ESMA’s	framework.	It	argues	that	given	the	greater	
levels	 of	 integrated	 capital	markets	 supervision	 now	occurring,	 ESMA’s	 governance	model	
needs	 recalibrating	 to	better	 recognise	 this	new	reality,	whilst	also	balancing	 this	with	 the	
competing	national	interests.	Strengthening	ESMA	is	not	an	end	in	itself,	however,	and	any	
governance	 refinements	would	 be	 implemented	with	 the	 imposition	 of	 additional	 control	
and	 accountability	 requirements.	 In	 particular,	 the	 paper	 proposes	 a	 bigger	 role	 for	 the	
Parliament,	and	the	creation	of	a	regular	Capital	Markets	Dialogue	to	ensure	critical	debate	
and	deliberation	 in	relation	to	ESMA’s	action	or	 inaction.
202
	ESMA	is	now	a	central	actor	 in	
EU	 financial	 markets	 regulation	 and	 supervision,	 and	 reshaping	 its	 governance	 and	
accountability	mechanisms	is	vital	to	guarantee	both	its	autonomy	and	legitimacy.	
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